A friendly workplace is no defence to harassing a minor

The Court of Criminal Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) on 6 January 2026 dismissed an appeal by a man convicted of subjecting a girl under 15 to unwanted conduct with sexual connotations. Madam Justice Consuelo Scerri Herrera held that the first court reasonably believed the complainant, whose account was supported by a co-worker and by the accused's own police statement. The court also held that an informal, family-like workplace is no defence to sexual harassment of a minor.

The facts

In Il-Pulizija vs H.J., the police charged the accused before the Court of Magistrates (Malta) with subjecting a vulnerable minor under 15 to acts, words or conduct with sexual connotations between 2020 and 2022. The charge said the conduct was unwanted and could reasonably be considered offensive, humiliating, degrading or intimidating. The complainant worked where the accused was her superior.

On 22 September 2025 the Court of Magistrates found him guilty. Under article 28A of the Criminal Code (Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta) it sentenced him to two years' imprisonment suspended for four years and fined him €7,000. It issued a three-year restraining order under article 382A, ordered his name entered in the register under Chapter 518 of the Laws of Malta, and ordered him to pay €48.69 in expert costs.

He appealed on two grounds. He argued that the first court wrongly assessed the evidence, because the complainant was not credible, the police never proved that certain chat messages came from his phone, and a supervisor saw nothing improper. He also argued that the sentence was excessive given his clean record and his cooperation with investigators.

What the court held

The court restated its approach to appeals on the evidence. It does not lightly disturb the first court's assessment, but examines the record to see whether that court could legally and reasonably reach its conclusion. It intervenes only if a conviction on that evidence is not safe and satisfactory.

The complainant testified to repeated unwanted physical contact, including kisses, at moments when others could not see. A co-worker testified that she had seen some of it herself. In his police statement the accused admitted part of the conduct and said “hemmhekk żbaljajt” (there I was wrong).

In court, however, he denied the kisses and gave a different account of the other contact. The court found that the complainant's evidence was consistent and corroborated, and that it was the accused who contradicted himself.

The court rejected the defence that the workplace was informal and friendly, like a family. It agreed with the first court that “tali ċirkostanza bl-ebda mod ma tista’ titqies bħala difiża valida jew leġittima għal aġir li jikkostitwixxi fastidju sesswali” (such a circumstance can in no way be considered a valid or legitimate defence to conduct amounting to sexual harassment), still less where the victim is under 18.

On intent, the court noted that the accused was a mature adult in a position of authority over the minor, and that he admitted in his statement that he had done wrong. His claim that he lacked mens rea, the required criminal intent, was not credible. The conviction also did not rest on the chat messages, to which the first court gave little weight.

On sentence, the court applied the settled test. A court of appeal changes a sentence only if it is wrong in principle or manifestly excessive, not because the appeal judge would have imposed less. A suspended prison term combined with a fine is not excessive for that reason alone.

The sentence fell within the limits of the law. The court added that the conduct was worse because an employer committed it against an employee. It dismissed the appeal.

Why it matters

A defence that relies on a relaxed workplace culture will not answer a charge of conduct with sexual connotations towards a minor. Admissions in a police statement that match the complainant's account can decide credibility, especially if the accused later changes his version. An appeal against a suspended sentence and a fine must show an error of principle, not severity alone.

Where it sits

The judgment applies the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt and the settled limits on appellate review. On the assessment of evidence, the court followed the Court of Criminal Appeal (28 April 1995 and 10 May 2002). On sentence, it relied on the Court of Criminal Appeal in its superior jurisdiction (25 August 2005 and 15 December 2005) for the “wrong in principle or manifestly excessive” test.

The court also cited the Court of Criminal Appeal (26 February 2009), which added that an appeal court may weigh circumstances arising after the first judgment. On the purposes of punishment it quoted the same court (28 November 2006). On suspended sentences it followed the same court (13 November 2009), which set three stages: decide whether prison is merited, then its length, and only then whether to suspend it.

Source

Court of Criminal Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction), 645/2022/1, 6 January 2026.