Appeal on facts from the Industrial Tribunal is null
The Court of Appeal declared null a worker's appeal alleging dismissal for pregnancy, because the tribunal had found as a fact that her irregular status was the reason. It matters to anyone appealing a tribunal decision.
Mr Justice Lawrence Mintoff, sitting in the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction), on 3 June 2026 declared null an appeal by a worker who argued that she was dismissed because she was pregnant. The Industrial Tribunal had found that the dismissal followed her irregular immigration status, not her pregnancy. The court held that none of her three grounds raised a point of law decided by the tribunal.
The facts
A.P., a third-country national, started work with Absolute Services Limited in 2022 under a three-year contract. Her permit to work in Malta was valid for one year. She kept working for about two months after it expired, when the company ended her employment. She was pregnant during this period.
Before the tribunal she argued that her superiors' attitude changed once she told them of the pregnancy, and that the company failed to renew her residence permit to make way for her dismissal. The company argued that it sent her the renewal forms months before the permit expired and that she never supplied the required documents. It said it could not lawfully keep her without a valid permit.
The tribunal found that the company started the renewal process months before the permit expired and chased her for the documents repeatedly. By the time her employment ended she had still not supplied compulsory documents. It found that two other pregnant employees kept their jobs.
The tribunal concluded that the reason for the dismissal was her irregular status, to which she herself fully contributed. It declared the dismissal neither unfair nor unlawful and sent a copy of its decision to Jobsplus, Identità and the Department for Industrial and Employment Relations.
What the court held
On appeal she raised three grounds. The first argued that a three-year contract for a worker with a one-year permit breached article 5(3) of S.L. 217.17 and Directive 2011/98/EU. The second argued direct discrimination on grounds of pregnancy, contrary to article 45 of the Constitution, article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Legal Notice 439 of 2003. The third invoked proportionality and the right to a fair hearing.
The company pleaded that the appeal was inadmissible because it raised no point of law decided by the tribunal. It added that discrimination had never been pleaded before the tribunal.
The court held that under article 82(3) of the Employment and Industrial Relations Act (Chapter 452 of the Laws of Malta), cases within article 75(1)(a), (b) and (c) may be appealed only on a point of law. That covered both the unfair dismissal claim and the discrimination issues, which fall under Title I of the Act.
On the first ground, the court held that the ground raised no point of law the tribunal had considered. An attack on the length of employment stipulated in the contract, it held, is not a point of law.
On the second, the court held that the tribunal found as a fact that she was not dismissed for being pregnant. The ground could succeed only if the court varied the tribunal's appreciation of the evidence, "xi ħaġa li kif diġà ġie misjub, ma tistax issir f’dan l-istadju" (something which, as already found, cannot be done at this stage).
On the third, the court held that it has no power to examine constitutional or convention complaints. It still noted that the tribunal gave both parties the same opportunity to present their case. The court abstained from hearing the appeal, declared it null and ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the appeal.
Why it matters
An appeal from the Industrial Tribunal must name a point of law the tribunal decided. A finding on why an employee was dismissed is a finding of fact, and grounds built on the opposite premise will not be heard.
Workers who believe they were dismissed because of pregnancy should plead discrimination before the tribunal and prove it there. The appeal stage offers no second look at the evidence, and new constitutional or European arguments raised there will not help.
Where it sits
Article 75(1) gives the tribunal exclusive jurisdiction over unfair dismissal and over breaches of Title I of Chapter 452, which includes protection from discriminatory treatment. Article 82(3) limits appeals to points of law, so the tribunal's appreciation of the evidence is final.
The Court of Appeal in its inferior jurisdiction also has no power in such an appeal to decide whether fundamental rights were breached. A complaint of that kind belongs in separate proceedings before a court with constitutional jurisdiction.
The appellant cited a decision of the Industrial Tribunal (31 May 2024) on natural justice, and Court of Appeal judgments on immigration appeals. The court's own reasoning named no authority and rested on articles 75(1) and 82(3).
Source
Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction), 62/2025, 3 June 2026.