Demanding a cut to release public payment is corruption
The Court of Criminal Appeal found a former local council official guilty of corruption and money laundering after he made a contractor pay 10% before releasing money due. Relevant to lawyers in public corruption and laundering cases.
In Il-Pulizija vs D.N., the Court of Criminal Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) on 31 July 2026 partly allowed an appeal by the Attorney General against an acquittal on every charge. Madam Justice Natasha Galea Sciberras found D.N., who held public office in a local council at the time, guilty of corruption and money laundering.
The court held that an official who makes a contractor pay a cut before releasing money due to him commits corruption, even where the demand comes after the contract is awarded.
The facts
The Court of Magistrates (Malta), sitting as a Court of Criminal Judicature, acquitted D.N. of 21 charges on 26 October 2023. The charges covered 2009 and 2010 and included misappropriation, exaction, corruption, use of false documents and money laundering. A waste contractor engaged by the council testified that D.N. showed him three cheques and said he would not be paid unless he handed over 10%.
The contractor said D.N. also threatened to keep his bid bond, and that he later agreed. D.N. said the cheques paid for private work he had done for the contractor. The Attorney General appealed on the evidence and on the law.
What the court held
D.N. first argued that the appeal was null. Under article 413(1)(b) of the Criminal Code (Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta), the Attorney General may appeal from summary proceedings only on limited grounds. The court held that this paragraph applies only to proceedings under article 370(1).
This case had run as a compilation of evidence under article 370(3), so article 413(1)(c) applied, and article 413(2) drew in the connected summary offences. Later amendments that widened the magistrates' competence did not change this, because the rule on the more favourable penalty in article 27 does not reach purely procedural questions.
On the merits, the court would not disturb a conclusion the first court could legally and reasonably reach, and it left most acquittals in place. The prosecution had taken signature samples but never asked for a handwriting expert, so the use of false documents was not proved.
The corruption charge was different. The contractor contradicted himself in cross-examination, but the documents backed his first account. Four of nine cheques came to exactly 10% of the net price after VAT.
Cheques were made out to people close to D.N. and to a company that denied any dealings with the contractor, yet the money always ended in D.N.'s account. D.N. said he always issued invoices but produced none. The first court had held that Maltese law does not recognise corruption after the fact.
The appeal court held that the threat brought the conduct within article 115(1)(a): D.N. asked for a payment he had no right to, so that he would do his duty and pay the contractor.
The court put it plainly: “L-appellat bħala impjegat jew uffiċjal pubbliku ma kellu ebda jedd għal dawk il-flejjes u ma kellux iħallat flimkien l-irwoli pubbliċi u privati tiegħu.” (As a public employee or officer, the appellant had no right to that money and should not have mixed his public and private roles.)
On money laundering, the court applied article 2(2)(a) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (Chapter 373 of the Laws of Malta), which lets the prosecution prove the underlying crime by circumstantial evidence without a prior conviction.
Once the prosecution shows a link between the accused, the crime and the money, and no reasonable explanation emerges, article 22(1C)(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, applied through article 3(3) of Chapter 373, puts on the accused the burden of proving lawful origin on a balance of probabilities. The absence of unexplained wealth did not answer the charge.
Routing cheques through third parties before banking them could not count as money simply circulating in a business. D.N. produced no invoice, so he did not discharge the burden.
On sentence, article 27 required the lighter penalty in force at the time of the offence, and under article 17(h) money laundering was the gravest offence. The court imposed a fine of €35,000 and two years' imprisonment suspended for four years under article 28A, with perpetual general interdiction and confiscation of €24,482.
Why it matters
An official who ties the release of public money to a private payment cannot shelter behind the rule against corruption after the fact. In laundering cases the prosecution need not show unexplained wealth. A defence that rests on private work needs invoices or receipts, because the burden shifts once the link to the crime is shown.
Where it sits
Corruption under article 115 needs the meeting of two wills, and Maltese case law holds that, without a prior agreement, there is no corruption of an officer after he has done his duty. The court cited the Court of Criminal Appeal (28 March 2012) for that rule and found that the threat and the contractor's consent supplied the agreement.
On misappropriation it cited the Court of Criminal Appeal (1 March 1952) and (31 May 2012): the offence needs reversal of title and an intent to gain. On the shifted burden it followed the Court of Criminal Appeal (19 January 2012) and the Court of Criminal Appeal (Superior Jurisdiction) (31 July 2014), which applied the principles set by the Constitutional Court (1 April 2005).
On the preliminary point it cited two judgments of the Constitutional Court (23 June 2025).
Source
Court of Criminal Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction), 413/2023/1, 31 July 2026: 413/2023/1