Seeking money to sway a tender is trading in influence

The Court of Criminal Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) on 21 April 2026 dismissed M.J.'s appeal against convictions for bribery, trading in influence and a false declaration. Madam Justice Consuelo Scerri Herrera held that a request for money made with the aim of influencing a tender completes the offence under article 121A(2) of the Criminal Code. She also held that the punishment depends on when the evidence shows the offence was committed, not on the wider period stated in the charge.

The facts

M.J. held a part-time contract with a body regulated under the Local Government Act (Chapter 363 of the Laws of Malta). He took part in the evaluation of a tender for a project run by that body. The prosecution charged him with six offences said to have been committed between 2013 and 2016.

The case rested on an email M.J. sent a prospective bidder on 24 July 2014, and on a later meeting at which, according to the bidder's evidence, M.J. asked for money. A police superintendent testified that the email passed a supplier's details to the bidder before the call for bids.

On 23 April 2025 the Court of Magistrates (Malta) as a Court of Criminal Judicature acquitted M.J. of fraud and misappropriation. It found him guilty of soliciting a bribe, trading in influence and making a false declaration to a public authority. It sentenced him to four years and eight months' imprisonment with perpetual general interdiction.

What the court held

On trading in influence, the court did not accept the first court's reasoning in full. Directing the evaluation committee's report did not by itself give M.J. the capacity to influence the adjudicating board. The court still found the offence proved under article 121A(3), which makes the offence complete whether or not the claimed capacity existed or the influence was exerted.

The court relied on a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal (10 January 2014), which read the article with the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and its stress on corrupt intent. It was convinced that M.J. meant to use his position when he asked for money. In its words, the request “saret bil-għan li juża l-influwenza tiegħu fuq il-proċess tat-tender” (was made with the aim of using his influence on the tender process).

On the second ground, M.J. argued that he was not a public officer. The court noted that the first court had found him to be a public employee, not a public officer, a distinction the Attorney General stressed. The body he worked for exists to represent all local councils under regulations made under Chapter 363, so he was a public employee even on a part-time contract.

On punishment, Act IV of 2013, promulgated on 14 June 2013, raised the punishment under article 121A from three to 18 months to three to six years. M.J. argued that, since the charge period began in 2013, article 27 required the less severe punishment. The court held that article 27 compares the law at the time of the offence with the law at the time of trial, and says nothing of the period in the summons.

Following earlier case law, the court described the summons as a notice to appear, not the basis of the charge. The evidence placed the offence at the email of 24 July 2014, so the amended punishment applied. Even treating the conduct as a continuing offence under article 18, the court held that it would start from that email.

The court rejected a plea that the conduct was only an attempt, because article 121A(2) is complete once a request is made. It held that the sentence fell within the law and that the first court had gone towards the minimum, despite M.J.'s clean record and age. It dismissed all the grounds of appeal.

Why it matters

A person accused of trading in influence gains little by showing that he could not in fact sway the decision-maker. What the prosecution must prove is the aim behind the request.

Defence lawyers relying on article 27 need evidence that the offence came before the change in the law. A wide charge period will not carry the older, lighter punishment on its own.

Where it sits

Article 121A was modelled on article 12 of the Council of Europe convention, which targets the influence peddler who trades on real or supposed influence over a public decision. The court drew on the Court of Criminal Appeal (17 March 2016), where the capacity to influence was not proved. That judgment in turn followed the Criminal Court (13 July 2006) and the Court of Criminal Appeal (17 September 2008), which split the article into an active and a passive offence.

On who is covered by the bribery provisions, the court cited article 92 of the Criminal Code, article 110(6) of the Constitution and Professor Anthony Mamo's notes, which read article 115 widely. On the more lenient law, it applied article 27 with the same notes and followed the Court of Criminal Appeal (28 September 2006) and (25 July 1994) on the function of the summons.

On sentence, it applied the rule that an appeal court does not disturb a punishment within the law unless it is wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. It cited among others the Court of Criminal Appeal (24 September 2009) and (20 December 2022).

Source

Court of Criminal Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction), 21 April 2026, 658/2019/1