Time bar on complex crimes runs from the inquiry's close

The Criminal Court on 16 April 2026 dismissed eight pleas of prescription raised by S.A. and his co-accused before their trial. Mr Justice Giovanni Grixti held that, in a complex case that grew out of a magisterial inquiry, the time bar started to run only when the inquiring magistrate closed the proċess verbal (the magistrate's final report). The court also accepted that the period is measured by the punishment for each offence on its own, without the increase allowed for a continuing offence.

The facts

The Attorney General filed a bill of indictment against S.A., other individuals and several companies. The counts allege money laundering, fraud, private-sector corruption, false declarations to public authorities and related offences, each charged as a continuing offence committed between 2005 and 2019.

The case grew out of a magisterial inquiry opened on 25 May 2017 at the request of a private person. The magistrate closed the proċess verbal on 1 March 2021, and the accused were brought before a court under arrest on 22 March 2021.

Before trial, the accused raised pleas under article 438(2) of the Criminal Code (Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta). They argued that the criminal action on several counts was extinguished by prescription under article 449(1)(c). They later withdrew two of the pleas, and the court decided the remaining eight.

What the court held

The accused argued first that the prescriptive period must follow the punishment for each offence alone, without the one or two degrees that article 18 allows for a continuing offence. The court leaned towards that view. It relied on a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal (29 October 2018), which read article 689 to mean that regard is had only to the punishment to which an offence is ordinarily liable.

The second question was when the period starts. Article 691(1) makes time run, for a continuing offence, from the day of the last breach. Article 692 adds that prescription for crimes does not run while the offender is unknown.

The accused submitted that the police knew of the allegations from the notitia criminis (the formal report of an offence) filed in March 2017, and had taken part in the inquiry. The court disagreed. It held that the police only assist the inquiring magistrate, and that the inquiry revealed “strutturi fuq strutturi dwar allegat habi ta’ flus u allegat riciklagg taghhom” (structures upon structures of alleged concealment of money and its alleged laundering).

The inquiry had been requested by a private person under article 546(4C), as it stood before Act VIII of 2025. Under that procedure neither the Attorney General nor the police were parties, so the court found no culpable failure by the prosecution. It held that “iz-zmien tal-preskrizzjoni f’dan il-kaz jibda’ jiddekorri mid-data tal-eghluq tal-proces verbal” (the prescriptive period in this case starts to run from the date the proċess verbal was closed).

Only from that date, the court reasoned, could the prosecution know of the alleged offences and who committed them. It then took each count in turn. The count under article 121B, punishable by three to 18 months, is prescribed in five years under article 688(d), while the fraud counts under articles 308 to 310 and the corruption count under article 115(1)(c) carry 10-year periods.

Counting from 1 March 2021 to the arraignment on 22 March 2021, none of the periods had run. The court dismissed pleas one to eight and took no cognisance of the two pleas withdrawn.

Why it matters

Defence lawyers in long financial cases cannot assume that the time bar started when a complaint was lodged or when the police first heard of it. Where an inquiry requested by a private person is complex and the prosecution was not at fault, the Criminal Court counted from the closure of the proċess verbal.

Prosecutors, for their part, should expect the prescriptive period to be measured by the punishment for the offence alone, without the article 18 increase.

Where it sits

Prescription extinguishes the criminal action after a set time, graded in article 688 by the punishment the offence carries. A continuing offence under article 18 treats several acts that breach the same provision under a single resolution as one offence, with a punishment that may rise by one or two degrees.

The 2018 appeal judgment, which the court quoted at length, described the continuing offence as a legal fiction devised for the benefit of the offender. On that view, it should not be used to bring back acts that would otherwise be time-barred.

On the starting point, the court relied on Professor Anthony Mamo's Notes on Criminal Law, which read “unknown” in article 692 strictly. It also followed a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal (18 May 2011), which asked whether the authority responsible for prosecuting had been at fault, and cited the Italian writer Giulio Crivellari on the reasons for prescription.

On the meaning of continuing and permanent offences, the court referred to the Court of Criminal Appeal (5 July 1996), (9 July 1996) and (23 January 2001).

Source

Criminal Court, 16 April 2026, 28/2024/1