Tribunal's finding of when discrimination began is final

Mr Justice Lawrence Mintoff, sitting in the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction), on 20 May 2026 declared null an appeal by a former employee who argued that his discrimination claim against Transport Malta was filed in time. The Industrial Tribunal had found the claim out of time under article 30(1) of the Employment and Industrial Relations Act (Chapter 452 of the Laws of Malta). The court held that the date the discrimination came to light was a finding of fact, and appeals from the tribunal lie only on points of law.

The facts

G.D. worked with Transport Malta for many years. As he approached pension age, he asked the authority to extend his employment until he turned 65. He argued that the authority had always granted such requests.

On 3 April 2024 the authority told him by email that his request was refused and gave him his last working day. He was told that, under a new policy, only highly technical positions would be extended. In August 2024 he learned that the authority had extended other employees who did not hold such positions.

He filed his claim under article 26 of the Act on 11 October 2024. The authority pleaded that the four-month term in article 30(1) had expired, counting from the refusal. The tribunal agreed. It found that on 3 April 2024 he already knew colleagues had been kept on past retirement age, and declared the action lapsed.

What the court held

The appellant argued that the tribunal used the unfair dismissal approach, where time runs from the end of employment, for a discrimination claim. In discrimination, he submitted, time runs once the discrimination becomes known, and the comparator is essential. He said it came to light only in August 2024. In the alternative, he argued that time ran from the day he retired.

The authority argued that the refusal was a specific decision with continuing consequences, not a continuing act. It submitted that time runs from when the cause of action crystallised, not from when the claimant felt discriminated against. On his reading, it said, the action would never lapse.

The court began with the authority's preliminary plea. Under article 82(3) of Chapter 452, cases within article 75(1)(a), (b) and (c) may be appealed only on a point of law. A claim under article 26 falls within Title I of the Act, and so within article 75(1)(c).

The court found that the appeal rested on one proposition: that the tribunal should have taken August 2024, not 3 April 2024, as the start of the term. The tribunal had examined the evidence and found that on 3 April 2024 the appellant knew colleagues like him had been extended. That finding identified, as a matter of fact, when the discrimination came to light.

In the court's words, the question was not one of interpreting the law "iżda dwar kif il-fatti ġew interpretati fid-dawl ta’ dik il-liġi" (but about how the facts were interpreted in the light of that law). It held that the ground, though framed as a point of law, sought only to vary the facts the tribunal established.

The alternative argument pointed the same way. The court held that the retirement date had no relevance to the discrimination, except that it fell closer to the filing date. It abstained from hearing the appeal, declared it null and ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the appeal.

Why it matters

A party appealing a tribunal decision on a time limit must identify a true error of law, such as a wrong legal test for when time starts. An argument that the tribunal picked the wrong date on the evidence is a factual challenge, and the appeal will not be heard.

In discrimination cases, the safer course is to file within four months of the first adverse decision, even if better comparators surface later. Waiting for proof of different treatment can cost the claim.

Where it sits

Article 26 of Chapter 452 protects employees from discriminatory treatment, and article 30(1) sets a four-month term to bring a claim. The tribunal described that term as one of decadence, not prescription. A decadence term extinguishes the action itself, so the tribunal held it was bound to apply it and that doing so was not an excessive formality.

Article 82(3) then confines appeals from the tribunal to points of law, leaving its appreciation of the evidence final. The line between law and fact is where most such appeals are won or lost.

The parties cited several authorities. The appellant relied on decisions dated 28 January 2008 and 24 May 2023 and on a decision of the English Employment Appeal Tribunal. The authority relied on a Court of Appeal judgment of 25 June 2025 on appeals limited to points of law, an English employment law textbook and two English decisions on continuing acts. The court's own reasoning named none of them and rested on articles 75(1) and 82(3).

Source

Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction), 125/2025, 20 May 2026.